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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of lobbying by corporations when
investments are irreversible and government cannot commit to tax policies.
We show that industries which rely more heavily on sunk capital lobby more
vigorously and are generally more successful in obtaining tax breaks. Thus
lobbying can mitigate the capital levy problem. Nevertheless, these industries
invest less in long-run equilibrium than more flexible ones. We then consider
the effects of relaxing legal restrictions on corporate lobbying. When the
deadweight costs of lobbying fall, taxes on sunk capital tend to fall, but
political contributions may rise, as lobbyists compete more intensively for
political favors. On balance, a ban of lobbying may therefore cause
investment to rise or fall.
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smart@economics.utoronto.caDemocratic governments must be responsiveto the desires of voters, and
sotheymayﬁnditdifﬁculttocommittostablepoliciesovertime. Oneconse-
quenceofcommitmentfailureofconcerntopublicﬁnanceeconomistsisthe
“capital levy problem” (Barry Eichengreen, 1990). In this standard view, high
taxes on irreversible investments are tempting to governments since they
seem to impose small deadweight costs. But this is anticipated by rational
investors, so that saving is reduced, and sunk investmentsare discouraged in
favor of more ﬂexible ones.1
While the problem doubtless arises in a number of real-world situations,
the picture of commitment failure that emerges seems in general too bleak.
We argue that a richer theory of political equilibrium leads to very different
conclusions. While owners of sunk capital do not—in the language of Al-
bert O. Hirschman (1970)—have a good “exit” option in the face of taxation,
there remain signiﬁcant opportunities for “voice” in a democratic society. In
this paper, we show how lobbying by ﬁrms on behalf of shareholders can
mitigate—and even reverse—the logic of the capital levy problem.2
Of course, anyone can lobby for tax breaks, and most large ﬁrms in the
United States are said to do so.3 The key to our argument, therefore, is that
owners of sunk capital are more willing than other lobbyists to “pay” for tax
breaks. There is little incentive to lobby when capital is mobile among in-
dustries, and physical assets can easily be transformed to alternative uses:
with full mobility, the beneﬁts of tax reductions would be quickly dissipated
as new investment entered the industry and, conversely, shareholders can
avoid bearing tax increases by simply redirecting their funds to other sectors.
Thus preferential tax treatment is a public good to which individual ﬁrms or
industry associations have little incentive to contribute. In contrast, when
capital investments are sunk irreversibly in physical capital equipment that
has few alternative uses, lobbying can act to protect short-run proﬁts in an
industry.
To explore this notion, we consider a model in which ﬁrms initially an-
nounce investment plans and raise capital. Subsequently, industry lobby
groups offer direct ﬁnancial support to a legislator contingent on future tax
1This problem is closely analogous to the “hold-up problem” in private contracts subject
to renegotiation (Oliver E. Williamson, 1985).
2A number of other explanations have been advanced in the literature for why govern-
mentsareable toresistimpositionofcapitallevies, includingtheroleofreputation(Laurence
J. Kotlikoff, Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson, 1988) and the possibility that commit-
ment power is greater in a representative democracy (Persson and Guido Tabellini, 1994).
3The impact of lobbyists on tax policy in the U.S. has been only informally documented,
but the evidence suggests that taxation is a primary consideration determining contributions
of political action committees for many corporations. In a recent series of detailed interviews
with corporate executives, for example, when asked to cite examples of their PACs’ achieve-
ments, “about 90 per cent” cited tax breaks they had obtained (Dan Clawson et al., 1998). See
also Fred S. McChesney (1997) for a discussion of the role of industry lobbies in shaping the
1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act.
1policies, and tax rates are determined to maximize the politician’s prefer-
ences over contributions and political support. Finally, after tax rates have
been announced, ﬁrms may change their investment decisions before pro-
duction occurs, although doing so is costly.
In this model, if lobbying were not permitted, then tax rates would be
higher for industries with greater adjustment costs, and investment would
be inefﬁciently low in all industries. We show in Proposition 1 that the intro-
duction of lobbying must reduce the dependence of tax rates on adjustment
costs: in this sense, lobbying always mitigates the capital levy problem. In
fact, for plausible restrictions on parameters, ﬁrms with higher adjustment
costs will lobby so much more vigorously that they actually face lower tax
ratesin equilibrium thanmoreﬂexible ﬁrms. Thisreversesthestandardcon-
clusion about capital levies. This key prediction of the model appears to ﬁt
the pattern of effective tax rate differentials actually observed among indus-
tries in the U.S. and elsewhere.4 Tax preferences are frequently targeted at
industries—such as oil and gas, mining, and real estate—in which capital in-
vestments are essentially irreversible. (Indeed, investments in mineral ex-
ploration and development, for example, are quite literally “sunk”.) As well,
many preferences in the U.S. tax code seem to be directed at sunk assets, in-
cluding: (i)expensingof“intangible”assetssuchasadvertisingandgoodwill,
(ii) tax credits for research and development expenditures, and (iii) preferen-
tial treatment of residential housing investments.
We then consider the implications of lobbying for the pattern of invest-
ment among ﬁrms, which depends on the tax vector chosen by the politi-
cian and the contributions offered by lobbies in equilibrium. Despite fac-
ing lower taxes, industries that rely on sunk capital invest less in equilibrium
than more ﬂexible ones (Proposition 2). The reason is that lower taxes on
sunk assets must be supported by higher contributions from industry lobby
groups, which themselves act as distortionary taxes on investment by mem-
ber ﬁrms. Thus lobbying can never eliminate the capital levy problem en-
tirely,andinvestmentinallindustriesislowerthanifgovernmentcouldcom-
mit to tax rates before investments are sunk.
In fact, investment and consumer welfare may be lower when lobbying
is permitted than when it is not. To show this, we examine the impact of
changesinthedeadweightcostsoflobbying. (Forexample,whendeadweight
costs are zero, direct cash bribes are permitted; when deadweight costs are
100 per cent of contributions, lobbying is effectively banned.) When the cost
of lobbying falls, the politician is more easily swayed, and taxes on all indus-
tries tend to decrease. Nevertheless, Proposition 3 shows that investment
may fall in some industries, as competition among the lobbies is intensi-
ﬁed and political contributions rise. In general, the effect is to reallocate in-
vestment towards sectors that are the most effective lobbyists, rather than
those that are most productive. It is even possible that lobbying causes such
a small reduction in taxes and large increase in contributions that invest-
mentislowerinallindustries thanitwouldbeiflobbyingwerebanned. Thus
4See Jane G. Gravelle (1994) for a discussion of corporate tax differentials.
2the case for lobbying as a solution to government’s commitment problem is
weaker than it would at ﬁrst appear.
I The model
A The economy
Consider a competitive economy with n consumption goods. Firms in in-
dustry i = 1;:::;n employ a constant returns to scale technology Fi(Z;L)
to produce output from capital Z and labor L. To incorporate investment
adjustment costs in a simple way, we suppose that each ﬁrm chooses an ini-
tial investment level K; subsequently, after government has announced its
tax policies and producer prices are known, the ﬁrm hires labor and has an
opportunity to adjust its investment plan. Doing so is costly, however: ad-
justing investment from K to Z costs the ﬁrm H(Z;K) units of labor (the
numeraire). We assume that H(Z;K) also exhibits constant returns to scale
and let G(Z=K) = H(Z=K;1) denote adjustment costs per unit of initial in-
vestment; G(z) is convex, and G(1) = 0.
In addition to adjustment costs, the ﬁrm must pay the rental price of the
capital Z that is ultimately installed. Since the wage–rental ratio will be ﬁxed
inequilibriumforareasonexplainedshortly,wesettherentalpriceofcapital
to one without further loss of generality. Because of the constant returns as-
sumptions, the ﬁrm’s (short-run) proﬁt per unit of initial capital can be writ-
ten as a function
i(pi) = max
(z;l)
piFi(z;l)   Gi(z)   z   l (1)
where pi is the producer price in the industry. The aggregate output of the
industry is therefore by Hotelling’s lemma yi(pi;Ki) = i;p(pi)Ki, where Ki
is initial capital stock. Short-run proﬁts accrue to owners of old capital, who
are the residual claimants in the industry.
To close the model, we must specify consumer demands and factor sup-
plies. Consumers are one of two types, which we label “workers” and “cap-
italists”. Both types of consumer are endowed with labor, which they sup-
ply to ﬁrms in order to purchase consumption goods. Workers may supply
their labor only to ﬁrms producing consumption goods, whereas capitalists
may workin either the productionof consumption goods or of capital goods.
Capital goods are produced using a linear technology, with one unit of la-
bor required for each unit of capital produced. Since capitalists must be
indifferent between working in the two sectors of the economy (we assume
an interior solution to the capitalists’ problem), the rental price of capital is
ﬁxed at one in equilibrium. All consumers, whether workers or capitalists,
have identical preferences for consumption and labor supply, and prefer-
ences are separable in consumption goods and quasi-linear in labor supply:
U(x;l) =
P
i ui(xi)   l. When qi is the consumer price of good i, therefore,
aggregate consumer surplus in market i is given by some function si(qi), and
market demands are xi(qi) =  s0
i(qi) (Roy’s identity).
3B Government
Government levies speciﬁc taxes ti = qi   pi on each of the consumption
goods. These tax rates are announced after ﬁrms have chosen old capital
stocks Ki, but before the ﬁnal production plan (Li;Zi) has been chosen. This
difference in timing is the crucial distinction between old and new capital:
newcapitalisfreetomoveamongindustriestoavoidtaxes—orindeedcanbe
consumed as leisure—whereas old capital cannot. Given initial investment
Ki, the market for commodity i clears at prices such that
xi(qi) = yi(pi;Ki) (2)
which implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium producer price as a function of the
consumer price, say pi = i(qi;Ki). Let excise tax revenue generated from
industry i be Ri(qi;Ki) = (qi   i(qi;Ki))xi(qi). To simplify notation, we also
write i(qi) the rate of proﬁt as a function of the consumer price, using (2).
To providea benchmarkforthe analysis which follows, wederive second-
best efﬁcient tax policies for the model. Suppose that government is able to
commit to tax rates announced before initial investments (K1;:::;Kn) are
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i(qi)Ki] (3)





Since i = 0 for all i in long-run equilibrium, government correctly antic-
ipates that capital will earn no rents, and that excise taxes will be fully shifted
forwardtoconsumers. Producerprices arethereforeﬁxedatpi =  1
i (0), and












where r is the marginalcost of public funds at the optimum and i = qix0
i=xi
the price elasticity of demand. This is the standard Ramsey tax formula.
When government cannot commit to policy before investment is sunk,
but lobbying cannot occur, tax rates depart from the Ramsey formula, with
higherratesleviedonindustriesthatrelymoreonsunkcapital,sothatindus-
try supply is less elastic in the short run. This occurs for two reasons. First,
a tax on an inelastic industry appears to distort consumer demands less and
so have lower excess burden. Second, part of the tax on an inelastic industry
is shifted backward to owners of old capital, which is desirable given govern-
ment’sdistributional preferences. Ofcourse, neitheroftheseeffectsoperates
in long-run equilibrium, as initial investments are adjusted to equalize the
return to capital in all sectors, and all taxes are shifted forward to consumers.
4C Lobbying
After initial investments Ki have been sunk, ﬁrms in each industry form an
organizationto lobby government overtaxes. As in B. Douglas Bernheim and
Michael D. Whinston (1986), lobbying activities are described by a menu-
auction game: each lobby group chooses a schedule that speciﬁes the level
of contributions to the politician that will be paid in exchange for each pol-
icy that can feasibly be enacted. The vector of tax rates levied is then chosen
unilaterally by a politician. We assume the politician’s objective is a linear
combination of welfare W and the sum of contributions Ci from each indus-
try,





In this formulation, the parameter  indexes the sensitivity of the politician
to political contributions. Preferences of this form can be derived from a
model of political competition in which contributions are used by parties to
sway impressionable voters in the population—see Gene M. Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman (1996).5 Later in the paper, we investigate the impact of
changes in  induced by regulations imposed on political lobbying.
Membership in the group is mandatory for all ﬁrms in the industry, and
the group ﬁnances its political contributions with taxes on member ﬁrms
that are proportional to their stocks of old capital. The lobbyist then designs
itscontributionscheduletomaximizenetproﬁtintheindustry,i(qi)Ki Ci.
We restrict the contribution functions Ci to be chosen from some compact
set Ci.
II Equilibrium tax policies, contributions, and investment
To describe equilibrium in the economy, we initially take the vector of old
capital stocks K to be ﬁxed. (We later address the long-run equilibrium al-




1. The politician chooses a vector of consumer prices that are a best re-





i ()) 2 argmaxi(qi)Ki 
Ci(q) subject to item 1.
We conﬁne our attention to equilibria of the game in which all lobby-
ists offer truthful contribution schedules (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986).
A schedule Ci is said to be truthful if there exists a scalar vi such that Ci(q) =
maxfi(i(qi;Ki))Ki   vi;0g for all q. Thus a truthful contribution schedule
5See however Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate (2001) for a dissenting view of lobbying
and electoral competition.
5is one that offers to pay the politician the lobby’s total willingness to pay for
any policy vector, net of some target proﬁt level vi. Conﬁning attention to
truthful Nash equilibria is not as restrictive as it may seem: Bernheim and
Whinston show thatlobby i’s best responsecorrespondence toany strategies
of its opponents contains a truthful strategy.6
Moreover, a truthful Nash equilibrium policy vector q has a simple char-





[si(q) + ( + )i(qi)Ki] (6)
Equilibrium contributions from the lobbies induce the government to inter-
nalize the preferences of old capitalists. Naturally, this leads to tax policies
more propitious to capitalists than in an equilibrium without lobbying.
A Tax policies
In a truthful Nash equilibrium, then, the effect of political contributions is
merely to increase the weight on proﬁt in the government’s objective from 
to  + . Deﬁning i = p
iyi;p=yi as the short-run price elasticity of supply at
the optimum, the ﬁrst-order condition for t










Thus equilibrium tax rates differ from Ramsey tax rates by an additive term
that depends on the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF)  and the weight
on proﬁts in the politician’s objectives, as well as the supply elasticity.
The effect of lobbying on taxes can immediately be discerned by compar-
ing (7) to the tax rate that would be implemented if there were no lobbying,
so that  = 0. In the latter case, since  < ,8 tax rates would be decreasing
in the supply elasticity i: sunk industries would face higher taxes than ﬂex-
ible ones. Introduction of lobbying tends to decrease taxes in all industries
through the direct effect of  on (7). However, this will also typically increase
the MCPF , as government must increase at least some tax rates to meet
its revenue requirement. On balance, then, lobbying tends to decrease taxes
on sunk industries, at the expense of higher taxes for ﬂexible industries. This
reﬂectstheideathatindustrieswhichrelymoreheavilyonsunkcapitallobby
more vigorously and are rewarded with lower tax rates in equilibrium. In this
sense, lobbying must always mitigate the capital levy problem in the model.
6An intuitive argument for the result is as follows. At the equilibrium policy q
, each lobby
must bid its true marginal willingness to pay; otherwise it could change the slope of its con-
tribution function and induce the politician to move the policy in the direction of higher net
proﬁt. Butthenthereisnolossinbiddingtruewillingnesstopay,netoftheequilibriumpayoff
vi, at every policy vector that is not chosen in equilibrium.
7See Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Lemma 2. Grossman and Helpman (1994) show the
same property holds for any differentiable contribution functions.
8Itispossibletoshowthat,foranyrequiredrevenue  R > 0,
 > minf+;1gSince < 1,
it follows that 
 > .
6Indeed, the effect of lobbying can be strong enough even to reverse the
pattern of tax rates imposed in equilibrium.9 Observe that the second term
in (7) is negative and increasing in i when  +  > . This gives:
Proposition 1 Suppose that short-run elasticities of supply and demand are
independent of prices. Then ﬁrms which rely more on sunk capital ( lower)
face lower tax rates if and only if  +   .
Whenthepoliticianissufﬁcientlyresponsivetolobbycontributions,sunk
industries in fact face lower taxes than ﬂexible ones. This ambiguity in the
pattern of equilibrium tax rates reﬂects the two offsetting effects of invest-
ment ﬂexibility in the model.10 On the one hand, government regards in-
ﬂexible industries as relatively cheap sources of revenue—once investment
is sunk, taxes on these sectors appear to have low deadweight loss and posi-
tive distributional effects. On the other hand, these industries lobby most ef-
fectively, offering more in political contributions for tax reductions perdollar
of deadweight loss than more ﬂexible sectors. Which effect dominates de-
pends on the responsiveness of the politician to lobby contributions. When
contributions are valued highly compared to revenues ( +  > ), govern-
mentwouldchoosetomakealump-sumtransferfromgovernmentrevenues
to capitalists if it were possible to do so. When this is so, the effect of lobby-
ingdominatestheconventionaldeadweightlosseffect,andinﬂexiblesectors
face lower taxes than ﬂexible ones.
It is also instructive to compare equilibrium taxes to efﬁcient, Ramsey
taxes. Observe that when  +  =  then the second term in (7) vanishes,
so that tax rates are independent of supply elasticities and proportional to
Ramsey taxes. Nevertheless,tax rates in all sectors would exceed Ramsey lev-
els,because > r: theMCPFinequilibriummustexceedtheRamseylevel.
Thuslobbyingcannoteliminatethedistortions associatedwithcommitment
failure, evenif  had felicitously been chosen to eliminate the dependence of
tax rates on supply elasticities. To establish this assertion, however, we must
lookatthedeterminationofequilibriumlobbycontributionsandinvestment
levels, which is the subject of the next sections.
B Political contributions
We have argued lobbying will offset government commitment failure in the
sensethatitleadstolowertaxesoninﬂexiblesectors,relativetoﬂexibleones.
It remains to be seen, however, how lobbying inﬂuences the distortions in
9In the model, the degree of investment ﬂexibility is an exogenous characteristic of ﬁrms,
rather than a choice. Alternatively, ﬁrms might wish to make investments that increase ﬂex-
ibility, and so become less attractive targets for taxation. In the same vein, Eckhard Janeba
(2000) shows ﬁrms may build excess capacity in multiple jurisdictions, creating a credible
threat to move production offshore when taxes are high.
10Here,irreversibilityofinvestmentismeasuredbytheshort-runsupplyelasticity. Notethat
if all industries have identical Cobb–Douglas production functions and the adjustment cost
function is Gi(z) = (1+i)
 1z
1+i  z, then the short-run supply elasticity is proportional to
1=i, and is independent of prices and increasing in marginal adjustment costs, as required
for the proposition.
7long-run investment decisions that are at the heart of the capital levy prob-
lem. Do inﬂexible ﬁrms invest more or less than comparable ﬂexible ﬁrms?
Would investment be higher or lower if lobbying were banned altogether?
Characterizing investment requires us to determine the equilibrium con-
tribution levels C
i , about which so far we have said nothing. In general,
equilibrium contributions and payoffs in a common agency game need not
be unique; with multiplicity in the subgame, equilibrium investment would
also not be unique. In the more restrictive economic environment consid-
ered here, however, it is possible to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium
contribution levels.11 We show this as follows.
If C
i is a best response to the contributions of other lobbies, then it must
minimize the amount paid in equilibrium, while ensuring government im-
plements the equilibrium policy q in place of any alternative that is less fa-
vorable to lobby i. More formally, Bernheim and Whinston (1986, Lemma 2)
show that when C
i is a best response, there exists ^ qi 2 argmax
(q;C) with
the property that C
i (^ qi) = 0 and 
(q;C) = 
(^ qi;C). Thus, rearranging 

in (5), each contribution schedule must satisfy
C









Thus each lobby’s contribution compensates the politician for the loss in
consumer welfare and the loss in contributions from other lobbies in choos-
ing the equilibrium policy q instead of the policy ^ qi that would be chosen if
i did not contribute. Deﬁne V i(q;K) = V (q;K)   i(qi)Ki as the weighted
sum of preferences of government and all lobby groups, excluding group i.
To guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium contributions, we require that the
optimal tax problem be “well-behaved” in the sense that, if a single industry
did not lobby, all other industries would face lower tax rates.12
Lemma 1 Whentheoptimaltaxproblemiswell-behaved,theuniquetruthful
Nash equilibrium net proﬁt levels satisfy
vi(K)  i(q
i )Ki   C
i (q) =  1

max




To see why this is the unique equilibrium, observe that C
i is a best re-
sponse for i if it is the least costly way to induce government to implement
the equilibrium policy q in place of ^ qi, the policy government would choose
ificontributednothing. Sinceallotherlobbyistsmakepositivecontributions
at ^ qi, and contributions are truthful, then C
i must compensate government
for the proﬁt to other industries that is foregone when q is chosen (which
11GrossmanandHelpman(1994)discussuniquenessinarelatedexamplewithtwolobbies.
See also the extensive discussion in Avinash Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997).
12This condition is satisﬁed if the log of the revenue function in each market is sufﬁciently
concave in prices. The result relies on a more general theorem in Didier Laussel and Michel
Le Breton (2001). We are indebted to Didier Laussel for pointing out an error in our original
proof of this proposition and suggesting an alternative approach.
8equals the change in contributions from the other lobbies), as well as the
loss in consumer welfare W.
C The allocation of investment
In view of Lemma 1, a long-run equilibrium allocation of capital K is a so-
lution to the system of no-arbitrage equations
vi(K) = 0 (i 2 N) (10)
In what follows, we analyze stable equilibria, viz. those vectors K for which
the Jacobian of net proﬁts DKv(K) is negative deﬁnite. Because lobbying
leads to spillovers in investment decisions of the various industries (i.e. be-
cause @vi=@Kj 6= 0) equilibrium comparative statics are extremely compli-
cated in general. We will therefore assume that, in any long-run equilibrium,
feedback effects among industries are sufﬁciently small that, when long-run
proﬁt vi at the initial equilibrium rises as the result of a parameter change,









for any parameter l. To derive the comparative static properties of equilib-
rium investment, we then need only apply the envelope theorem to (9) in
order to calculate the local change in equilibrium proﬁt dvi in response to a
change in the parameter of interest.
Tosimplifytheanalysis, wehenceforth assume = 0; thatis, government
assigns no weight to capitalists’ short-run proﬁts in “true” economic welfare,
and the weight on proﬁt induced by lobbying is just . This assumption
makes the effect of lobbying more stark, but seems unlikely to affect quali-
tative results.
III Investment and Lobbying
A Adjustment costs and investment
We are now in a position to ask whether the more intensive lobbying activi-
ties of inﬂexible industries cause them to invest more in equilibrium of the
model. Tothisend,weindexindustryadjustmentcostsbyascalarparameter
ai  0, so that Gi(z) = G(z;ai). We assume:
A1. Gza(z;a)  0 if and only if z  1.
A2. For all i and all (pi;ai),
d
da







13This property holds if off-diagonal elements of DKv are sufﬁciently near zero.
9In geometric terms, Assumption A1 states that an increase in the adjustment
cost parameter a causes an anti-clockwise rotationin the short-run marginal
cost curve, around the point of no adjustment (z = 1). Thus an increase
in a raises the marginal cost of production if the ﬁrm is expanding invest-
ment and decreases it if the ﬁrm is contracting. Assumption A2 states that
an increase in adjustment costs, holding market demand ﬁxed, cannot cause
proﬁt to rise, despite its effect on the market-clearing price for the commod-
ity. (This is a restriction on technology alone, since the market clearing con-
ditions imply that dp=da =  pa=pp.) This rules out the implausible case in
which an increase in adjustment costs would raise industry proﬁt, even if tax
rates were ﬁxed. With these restrictions, we can establish:
Proposition 2 Assume A1 and A2. Then industries with higher adjustment
costs invest less in equilibrium, despite facing lower tax rates.
Inﬂexibleindustriesmayobtainpreferentialtaxtreatmentthroughlobby-
ing, but only at the cost of higher political contributions, which themselves
act as a distortionary tax on investment (paid to the politician directly rather
than to the ﬁsc). The proposition shows that the higher contributions paid
by inﬂexible industries more than offset the value of tax breaks that are pur-
chasedfromthepolitician. Thusthenetinvestmentdistortion isgreater, and
equilibrium investment lower, in inﬂexible sectors.
B Is lobbying desirable?
Proposition 2 has a further implication: investment in all industries must be
lower in an equilibrium with lobbying than in the efﬁcient, “Ramsey” alloca-
tion in which government can commit to taxes before investment is sunk. A
formal proof of this assertion can be found in our working paper (Marceau
and Smart, 2000), but the argument is straightforward. Eq. (7) shows that
even fully ﬂexible industries (with inﬁnite short-run supply elasticities) must
underinvest, relativetotheRamseylevel,becausethemarginalcostofpublic
fundsinequilibrium canbenolowerthanitsRamseylevel. Sinceinvestment
is a decreasing function of adjustment costs, it follows that investment is too
low in all industries. Thus lobbying can mitigate the capital levy problem but
never eliminate it entirely; lobbying is not a perfect substitute for commit-
ment.
A comparison of greater practical relevance is between the equilibrium
level of investment in an industry when lobbying is permitted and when it is
banned altogether. To address this question, we extend the model in a sim-
ple way to incorporate deadweight costs of lobbying: we suppose that, for
each dollar spent by the lobby group, only a fraction (1 ) is received by the
politician, where  2 [0;1]. Deadweight costs might reﬂect regulatory restric-
tions on political contributions. For example, if cash bribes are permitted
than  = 0, whereas  > 0 if contributions are restricted to in-kind transfers
of vacation trips, aid in seeking re-election, and so on. If lobbying is banned
altogether then  = 1. It is easy to see that, if the weight on contributions
in the politician’s objective is some 0 > 0, then the weight on proﬁts in the
10induced policy objective function V (q;K) is just  = 0(1   ). We therefore
represent a “marginal” tightening of regulations by a decrease in , and an
outright ban by a shift to  = 0.
One might expect that an increase in  would simply lower taxes in all
industries and so increase investment. However, an increase in  also inten-
siﬁes competition among lobbies for political favors, which may cause equi-
librium contributions to rise. Calculating @vi=@ from(9) immediately yields
the following result.
Proposition 3 Deregulation of lobbying (an increase in ) causes investment
tofallinindustryiifandonlyifequilibriumconsumersurplusissmallerwhen
industry i does not lobby, i.e. W(q) > W(^ qi).
Proposition 3 provides a condition for identifying politically disadvan-
taged groups, whose net proﬁts fall when lobbying is deregulated. These
are groups for which consumer welfare would fall if they chose not to lobby,
andwhichmustthereforepayhighercontributions whenthepoliticiancares
relatively little about welfare. When industry i does not lobby, it will face a
higher tax rate than in equilibrium, and the politician will place relatively
more weight on consumer welfare and less on proﬁts when choosing q. Thus
onemightthinkthepoliticianwouldnecessarilychoosetaxessuchthatW(^ qi) >
W(q). But this intuition ignores standard second-best considerations: the
higher tax imposed on commodity i also tends to exacerbate distortions in
other markets, and so to increase the aggregate deadweight costs of taxation.
On balance, welfare may be lower when i does not lobby.
Indeed,itisevenpossiblethatinvestmentinallindustriesincreasesmono-
tonically in , so that investment is maximized when lobbying is banned al-
together. We show this with the following example.
Example1: Abanonlobbyingmaximizesinvestment. Supposethatdemand
and proﬁt functions are identical in all industries, and that price elasticities
of demand and supply are constant. In this case, (7) shows the equilibrium
q is a uniform tax system. But a uniform tax must also maximize consumer
welfare—this can be seen by substituting + = 0 into (7). Since q maxi-
mizes W, we have W(q) > W(^ qi), and all industries are politically disadvan-
taged in the sense of Proposition 3. As  rises through deregulation, the in-
tensiﬁed lobbying efforts of all industries merely cancel each other out, and
the politician continues to implement a uniform tax system. However, the
political contributions necessary to support the equilibrium rise with  in all
industries, so that consumer prices are higher and investment is lower.
It follows that investment and consumer welfare are maximized in this
example when lobbying is banned ( = 0). When this is so, investment in
all industries attains the efﬁcient, Ramsey level. The example is an extreme
one, since all industries rely to the same extent on sunk investment, and a
government subject to commitment failure would have no reason to depart
from the Ramsey tax rule in the absence of lobbying. But the example shows
that political contributions may result in efﬁciency losses, even if they have
no deadweight cost themselves, through their effect on industrial costs and
11prices.
Example 2: Lobbying increases investment in all sectors. In a mild extension
of our model, suppose that commodity tax revenues are returned to con-
sumers as equal per capita lump-sum transfers. This ﬁxes the MCPF at unity
in the Ramsey and equilibrium tax formulas (4) and (7). It follows that the








(Notice that all industries receive net subsidies in the case that  > 1.) Be-
cause government has access to a lump-sum tax on consumers, tax rates
of different industries are no longer linked through the government budget
constraint. Therefore, if industry i did not lobby, the politician would assign
it a price ^ qi
i = argmaxsi(q), while other industries would continue to receive
their equilibrium prices q
j. It follows that
W(^ qi)   W(q) = si(^ qi
i)   si(q
i ) > 0
Applying Proposition 3, an increase in  causes contributions to fall and in-
vestment to rise in all industries. Investment is therefore higher when any
degree of lobbying is permitted than when it is banned. Indeed, to alleviate
the capital levy problem, lobbying should be facilitated as much as possible:
the political process should be designed to make the deadweight costs of in-
ﬂuence activities as low as possible.
IV Conclusion
Business tax systems in the U.S. and elsewhere exhibit substantial intersec-
toral differences in tax rates that create deadweight losses, often while serv-
ing no obvious public policy objective. We have argued some of these tax
differences may be attributed to differences in industries’ reliance on sunk
capital, and the resulting differences in the intensity of their lobbying efforts.
At ﬁrst blush, our argument suggests that business tax lobbying can mit-
igate government’s incentives to impose conﬁscatory levies on sunk capital.
But our results suggest the case for allowing lobbying activities is far more
ambiguous. While lobbying tends to reduce the overall tax burden on sunk
capital, political contributions represent additional costs which in turn de-
ter investment. The result is that some industries and assets gain at the ex-
pense of others, and lobbying leads to further misallocation of capital in the
economy towards politically favored groups. In extreme cases, in fact, all in-
dustries might lose from lobbying, if inter-sectoral differences in investment
ﬂexibility are sufﬁciently small. More generally, some industries are likely to
beneﬁt from lobbying, at the expense of others and of consumers, but the in-
vestment distortions introduced through political inﬂuence activities must
12be weighedagainst the conventionaldistortions resulting fromover-taxation
of sunk capital in order to provide a full assessment of the effects of lobbying.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let j(qj) = j(qj)Kj (we suppress Kj throughout the









be the joint payoff that can be obtained by the government agent and any set
S  N = f1;:::;ng of lobby groups. Our proof relies on the following result,
due to Laussel and Le Breton (2001), which we state without proof.
Lemma 2 (Laussel and Le Breton, 2001, Proposition 3.3) Assume that  (S) is
concave, i.e. S  T implies  (S [ fig)    (S)   (T [ fig)    (T). Then
the truthful Nash equilibrium payoff vi to each lobby i is unique, with vi =
 (N)    (N n fig).












Rj(qj)   R
where S  N, i;k 2 N n S, i 6= k. Let q
j(;!;S), j 2 N be the solutions
to this problem. By assumption, Wj(R 1
j (z)) is concave in z for all j, so that
q
i (;!;S) is non-decreasing in  for all (!;S). Of course, q




i (0;!;S [ fkg) = q
i (;!;S)  q
i (;!;S [ fkg)
Applying induction on k, it follows that S  T =) q
i (;!;S)  q
i (;!;T)
for all (;!). Thus, in this well-behaved case, increasing the set of industries
that lobby leads to non-lobbying industries facing higher taxes.
Obviously, W(0;0;S) =  (S) and W(0;;S) =  (S [ fig). By the enve-
lope theorem and the fundamental theorem of calculus,






i (0;!;S)  i(q
i (0;!;T) for all S  T  N implies  (S [ fig)  
 (S)   (T [ fig)    (T). That is,   is concave. The result then follows from
applying Lemma 2. 2


















where an asterisk on a function indicates it is evaluated at the equilibrium
prices q, and a hat that it is evaluated at the out-of-equilibrium prices ^ qi.
The ﬁrst term in brackets on the right-hand side of (11) is non-positive
in view of Assumption A2. To show the second term is negative, we require
^ i;a  0  







and i;pa =  Gzazi;p, so that Assumption A1 implies i;a  0 if and only if
zi  1. Next we show z
i  1  ^ zi: ﬁrms invest ex post in equilibrium but
would disinvest if their industry did not lobby. To see this, note A1 implies
z(pi;ai)  1 if and only if (pi;ai)  0: since ex post adjustment is costly, new






i  0, so z
i  1 and 
i;a  0.
Finally we show i(^ pi
i;ai)  0 so that ^ zi  1. Suppose not: Then, since
C












i () is not a best response for i (industry proﬁts would be higher if
the industry simply were not to contribute), a contradiction. Thus ^ zi  1 and
^ i;a  0. 2
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